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claims fell under the "disputes" meant to be arbitrated
under the Agreement. Furthermore, Pilkington contended that a court resolving PPG's claims would,
inescapably, have to examine the application, meaning,
and interpretation of the Agreement which was designated exclusively for arbitration in Article XII. Moreover, Pilkington noted that the motion was brought
under the auspices of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08. Pilkington argued
that the FAA represents a federal policy favoring
arbitration and that this policy "applies with special
force in the field of international commerce." Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985). Pilkington proceeded to argue that the
federal law superseded the court's discretion, limiting its
role to determinations of arbitrability and the enforcement of subsequent arbitration decisions.
Finally, Pilkington stated that the Agreement did not
preclude the application of United States antitrust law
during the arbitration. According to Pilkington, Article
XII's provision that the arbitration would be "in accordance with the laws of England" referred to a choice of
procedural law for the arbitration process rather than a
choice of substantive law. Pilkington supported its
position by referring the court to the language of Article
XIII, which mandated English law as the law governing
the provisions of the Agreement. Pilkington asserted that
if Article XII mandated English law as substantive law,
Article XIII would be redundant.
The court, based on the broad language of the
Licensing Agreement and the federal policy favoring

arbitration embodied in the FAA, especially in international commerce circumstances, granted Pilkington's
motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. In
doing so, the court rejected PPG's argument that
Mitsubishi was distinguishable due to a much narrower
arbitration agreement in the instant case. Also, the court
remained unpersuaded by PPG's position that the
prevailing law at the time the parties formed the 1962
Agreement controls as the primary indicator of the
parties' intentions.

United States antitrust law not waived by

agreement.
The court concluded that the language of Article XII
refers to procedural rather than substantive law, accepting Pilkington's contention that to hold otherwise would
render Article XIII a redundancy. The court acknowledged PPG's concern that the application of English law,
which does not recognize the Sherman Act, would serve
as a complete bar to PPG's recovery. Therefore, the
court held that the Agreement does not preclude the
application of United States antitrust law. However, the
court remedied the situation by obtaining a stipulation
from Pilkington that all arbitrations would be conducted
by applying United States antitrust law as the substantive law relevant to the dispute, regardless of the conflict
with correlating English law. Moreover, the court
retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure accordance with the court's decision.

Conspiracy claim based upon previous decree and
parallel business behavior not sufficient to establish
antitrust violation
by JenniferA. Hovaniec
In Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
ParamountFilm Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), the
United States Supreme Court held
that mere proof of parallel business
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behavior by motion picture producers and distributors does not
conclusively establish a conspiracy
to restrict first-run movies in
violation of the Sherman Act.

Additionally, the Court held that
prior decrees involving the respondent motion picture producers and
distributors ("respondents") are only
prima facie evidence of an alleged
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conspiracy and, without additional
evidence to support an illegal
agreement, cannot constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act.
The petitioner ("Theatre Enterprises") owns and operates Crest
Theater, located six miles from a
downtown shopping center in
Baltimore, Maryland. Crest Theater
opened on February 26, 1949.
Before and after the opening, the
theater's president continually
attempted to acquire first-run
features for the theater. A first-run
feature is the first exhibition of a
movie in a particular geographical
area. Approaching each of the
respondents individually, Theatre
Enterprises requested either a firstrun feature or an arrangement which
would allow two theaters to show a
first-rn at the same time. Adhering
to its policy of restricting first-run
features to downtown Baltimore
theaters, each of the respondents
denied Theatre Enterprises' request.
Crest Theater needed an exclusive
license to procure first-run features.
The respondents refused to give
Theatre Enterprises an exclusive
license because they owned three
downtown theaters which received
first-run features.

Petitioner's argument of
conspiracy theory proves
unavailing
Theatre Enterprises filed suit,
alleging that the respondents
conspired to restrict first-run
features to downtown Baltimore
theaters, thereby violating the
antitrust law(s). As a direct result,
Theatre Enterprises contended that
the respondents restricted it to
subsequent runs and unreasonable
clearances. In response, the respon740 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

dents claimed that day and date firstruns are usually granted to only noncompeting theaters. Since Crest
Theater would compete with the
downtown theaters, the arrangement
would be economically unfeasible.
Furthermore, the respondents
stressed the improbability of any
downtown exhibitor waiving its
clearance rights-the period of time
that must lapse between runs of the
same feature in a specified areaand additionally agreeing to simultaneous showings. The respondents
denied the existence of any collaboration and attributed the uniformity
of their refusals to deal with Theatre
Enterprises to individual business
judgment and the pure economics of
generating revenue, but not at the
expense of consumers. The respondents introduced evidence that Crest
Theater draws less than one tenth of
the patrons of a downtown theater
due to its location.
At trial, the jury found for the
respondents. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The
United States Supreme Court
granted Theatre Enterprises' request
for certiorari. Theatre Enterprises
claimed that the trial judge erred in
refusing to direct a verdict in its
favor and in instructing the jury
about the scope and effect of a
previous decree against the respondents in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In
Paramount,the respondents violated
antitrust laws by conspiring to
restrict first-run features and
favorable clearances for themselves.
Theatre Enterprises alleged that
since the same respondents were
found to have previously conspired
to establish a uniform system of
first-runs and clearances, use of the
same means justified a finding of

conspiracy in this case.

Mere uniformity of
refusals does not
constitute antitrust
violation
The Court considered the critical
issue to be whether the respondents'
uniform refusal to give first-run
features stemmed from independent
business decisions or an illegal
agreement. Business behavior is
admissible evidence, and an
agreement may be inferred from
such evidence. However, proof of
parallel business behavior does not
conclusively establish an offense
under the Sherman Act. Furthermore, the respondents introduced
evidence establishing the reasonableness of their actions. Thus, the
Court concluded that Theatre
Enterprises could not exclusively,
rely upon the uniformity of the
respondents' refusal to grant it a
first-run feature to establish an
antitrust violation.

Paramount decrees not
sufficient to establish
conspiracy
The Court held that no error
existed in the jury instructions
concerning the proper weight of the
Paramountdecrees. Section 5 of the
Clayton Act provides that:
[A] final judgment or decree
rendered against a defendant
in an equity suit brought by
the United States under the
antitrust laws 'shall be prima
facie evidence against such
defendant in any suit or
proceeding brought by any
other party against such
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defendant under said laws as
to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto.'
The trial court judge had admitted the decrees into evidence.
However, he explained to the jury
that the respondents had previously
conspired to restrict first-runs and
clearances in violation of the
antitrust laws and that this violation
could be used as prima facie
evidence to support Theatre Enterprises' claim. The trial court judge,
nonetheless, instructed the jury that
Theatre Enterprises could not rely
exclusively upon that evidence; it
needed to affirmatively show that

the respondents conspired to restrict
Theatre Enterprises to unreasonable
clearances or second-run features.
The Court concluded the instructions did not deprive Theatre
Enterprises of any of the benefits
conferred by Section 5 of the
Clayton Act.
Further, the Court noted that the
Paramountdecrees were not based
upon any findings regarding firstrun features or clearances in
Baltimore theaters. Moreover, the
conspiracy in the Paramountcase
existed as of 1945 and was enjoined
by June 1948; the conspiracy alleged
in the instant case began in February
1949. In order to prevail on a
conspiracy charge, Theatre Enterprises needed to show additional

evidence connecting the Paramount
decrees to Theatre Enterprises. The
Court explained that Theatre
Enterprises could not rely entirely
on its allegations of antitrust
violations based solely upon a
previous decree entered against the
respondents.
In conclusion, a conspiracy under
these circumstances, according to
the Court, does not result from the
mere uniformity of business
behavior, a previous finding of a
conspiracy does not conclusively
establish a conspiracy. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in favor of respondents.

District Court held Shennan Act will not reach

conspiratorial conduct occurring solely in foreign
jurisdictions
by JenniferBonjean

Editor's note:

indictment against Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd.
The United States Court of Appealsfor the FirstCircuit ("Nippon"), a Japanese corporation, for violating
reversed and remanded the following decision on March Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1996). The
17, 1997. The court noted that whether the Government Government alleged that in 1990, Nippon's predecessor,
may seek criminal prosecution under Section 1 of the Jujo Paper Co., Inc. ("Jujo"), conspired to fix prices of
Sherman Act basedsolely onforeignactivity is one offirst fax paper sold in the United States. In United States v.
impression.The courtheld that internationalconducthav- Nippon PaperIndustry Co., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 55 (D.
ing "substantialand intended effect" within the United Mass. 1996), the United States District Court for the
States bordersmay consitiute a criminalviolation under District of Massachusetts granted Nippon's motion to
Section 1. Forfurther information, see United States v. dismiss. The court held that the Government failed to
Nippon PaperIndustry Co., Lt., No. 96-2001,1997 WL adequately plead its claim that Nippon established a
vertical price fixing agreement with Japanese trading
109100 (1st Cir. (Mass.)).
companies which ultimately sold Nippon's fax paper to
American consumers. Furthermore, the court held that
The United States Government brought a criminal
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